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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM A

Richard A. Posner*

PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVEt

David Beatty, a Canadian law professor, entitles his audacious study of
constitutional law The Ultimate Rule of Law, and this raises an immediate
question: What does 'rule of law' mean? Traditionally it has meant two
distinct, though related, things. The first, which comes down to us from
Aristotle's discussion of correctivejustice in the NicomacheanEthics, is that
legal cases are to be decided according to the legal merits of the case
rather than the personal merits or deserts of the litigants; this is law's
impersonality. The second sense that the term bears, which became
important in the struggle of the English and later the Americans against
royal tyranny, is that the officials in a society, the 'rulers,' are subject to
law, rather than having unfettered discretionary power. The relation
between the two senses lies in the fact that unless the law is reasonably
clear, so that it really guidesjudges in applying it and provides a basis for
monitoringjudicial behaviour for conformity to law,judges will perforce
be deciding cases on something other than strictly legal grounds, and,
insofar as they enforce law against other officials, they will be the nation's
rulers rather than the law's servants. The threat that unclear law poses to
the rule of law is especially acute in the case of constitutional adjudication, in which the highest judges exercise practically final authority
without much guidance as to how they are to exercise it. Constitutions
tend - partly of necessity, because they are intended to last - to contain
many vague terms, terms that concern, or that are susceptible (because
of their vagueness) to being made to concern, highly political and
emotional subjects. The highest judges charged with interpreting and
applying the constitution, unconstrained either by a clear text or by a
higher tribunal, become the nation's supreme lawgivers.
Beatty is aware of this problem, but he believes he has solved it and so
brought constitutional law into conformity with the precepts of the rule
of law. His solution will startle most students of constitutional law. It is an
extreme version of legal pragmatism. Judges dealing with constitutional
issues are not to attend to the constitutional text, or to precedents ('in
constitutional cases, precedents are at best superfluous' [90]) or analo* Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; senior lecturer, University of

Chicago Law School.
t A review of David M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004). Subsequent references appear parenthetically in the text.
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gies; they are not to think of their task as interpretive at all; they are to
attend exclusively to the facts of the case. 'When judges are prepared to
look at all the facts of a case honestly and impartially, they have no
difficulty seeing and doing what is right' (112)1 - and Beatty means
legally right. This is pragmatism with a vengeance, though Beatty's
preferred word is 'proportionality.' ('Proportionality makes pragmatism
the best it can possibly be' [187].) The idea is that, to pass constitutional
muster, a law must represent a proportional, rather than an excessive,
response to some perceived social need. By carefully studying the facts of
the case, judges will be able, Beatty believes, to determine proportionality. And it will be an objective determination that they make, unaffected by
the vagaries of legal doctrine, constitutional text, precedent, theory,
ideology, or thejudge's emotions or temperament. 'Whenjudges remain
completely detached from the substantive values that are at stake in a
case, and take seriously all the evidence that shows what a law really
means for those it affects most, the cases show that the right answer is
usually pretty clear' (98).
This is an amazing claim, so let us see how Beatty defends it. He begins
with a highly critical discussion of efforts to create constitutional theories
that will generate substantive results. (His own theory, in contrast, implies
no specific case outcomes, though he believes, as we will see, that judges
guided solely by facts will converge more or less automatically on outcomes of which he approves.) He discusses such well-known theorists as
John Hart Ely, Roger Dworkin, Robert Bork, Cass Sunstein, and Jfirgen
Habermas. His criticisms are persuasive. About 'originalism,' for example, he comments pungently that 'directing judges to resolve the flashpoints of social conflict in their communities against the understandings
of people who lived as long as two hundred years ago, leaves them, it
turns out, free to come down on whatever side of a case their consciences
tell them is right' (9). Another example: the result of adopting Dworkin's
moral theory of constitutional interpretation would be that 'the people
lose control of the moral development of their communities to a moral
elite' (33 [footnote omitted]). By such examples Beatty argues convincingly that constitutional adjudication cannot be made objective, impersonal, and apolitical by means of a demonstration that there is one
correct constitutional theory. This is the strongest part of the book.
Beatty argues thatjudges should take their cue not from theorists - all
of whom are easily refuted - but from their own practices. And what they
mainly do, he claims, and thus what they should do in constitutional
cases as well, is weigh facts. He finds support for this view in the common
I Or, as he puts it elsewhere, 'everyone's interests are better served when the courts base

their decisions on a close and careful evaluation of the facts than when they spend most
of their energy trying to divine answers from the words of the text' (57).
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law method of rule making. 'The great genius of this ancient legal
tradition is its pursuit of theory and overarching principles from the
bottom up' (34); it is 'the method of induction' (34). Beatty contends
that this is not only how courts should approach constitutional adjudication but how they do approach it. For evidence he takes the reader on a
tour of the world's constitutional courts, arguing that, despite differences
in the wording of constitutional texts, in legal culture, in doctrine and
precedent, and so forth, the courts come up with remarkably uniform
results (though the us Supreme Court is a frequent outlier). About all
that the cases have in common is similar facts, so it must be, he concludes, the facts that are driving the outcome.
Beatty is mindful of the 'is/ought' problem that his analysis presents.
How can a study of facts, however careful and searching, generate a
conclusion that the position of one of the parties to a case is right and
the position of the other wrong? He never answers this question directly,
but he seems to think that 'proportionality' just happens to be the legal
norm on which the global judicial community has converged, and that
that is good enough. One senses an analogy to how the 'is/ought' gap is
closed in the case of a watch that is broken and therefore ought to be
fixed. Everyone agrees that the purpose of a watch is to keep time, and this
provides the major premise for a logical demonstration that if a watch is
broken, it should be fixed.2 It is an example of how agreement on a fact
(what the purpose of a watch is) can have a normative implication.
The world is a pretty big place, however. Beatty cites decisions from
only 15 of its 193 nations (plus decisions of one United Nations and two
European tribunals), and 11 of the 15 are former British possessions. His
sample of world judicial opinion, therefore, is hardly representative. He
has not demonstrated that 'proportionality' is a universal legal norm. Nor
is the convergence within his sample on specific case outcomes anywhere
near complete. There are also considerable doubts, which he does not
explore or even mention, about the appropriateness of thinking of the
world's constitutional courts as constituting a unified professional community.3 One would like to know something about how the judges of the
various courts are appointed, what incentives and constraints play upon
them, what authority they actually wield, their goals, and so forth before
deciding what weight to give to their opinions. On that Beatty says
nothing.
2 Actually the analysis is more complex. Were the watch an antique, valued for its
antiquity rather than its accuracy as a timepiece, the 'is' of its being broken might not
imply that it should be fixed; the same would be true if the cost of fixing the watch were
greater than the watch's value.
3 See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, 'Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age' (2004) 117
Harv.L.Rev. 2570, reviewing Norman Dorsen et aL, ComparativeConstitutionalism:Cases
and Materials (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2003).
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Among other problems with Beatty's thesis is the questionable legitimacy of a purely fact-driven conception of constitutional adjudication. I
agree that judges should be highly attentive to facts. But that a careful
study of the facts leads a judge to a confident conclusion that some
challenged law represents a disproportionate response to a social problem is not an impressive justification for invalidating the law. The solution to the 'is/ought' problem in the watch case required agreement on
the purpose of watches. What is the corresponding premise that enables
convergence on the legal significance of given facts? Can it really be
'proportionality'? If not (and I'll argue not), it will be no good falling
back on 'constitutional supremacy,' as Beatty repeatedly does in denying
that constitutional text, history, or precedent should have any weight in
the judge's decision and contending that the decision should be entirely
forward-looking. If none of these materials is to guide decision, the
'constitution' falls out of the picture. The highest judges are then
supreme, engaged not in an interpretive enterprise but in pure policymaking. It is remarkable that Beatty should excoriate interpretive
approaches to constitutional adjudication as unconstrained and therefore undemocratic - as when he describes interpretivism as 'profoundly
undemocratic' because it 'imposes virtually no constraints - no disciplining rules - on the discretion ofjudges' (56) - without turning the spotlight on his own unconstrained, undemocratic approach.
Yet, as a descriptive matter, he may be largely correct. Despite their
protestations, the highest judges in most countries may be paying little
attention to their country's constitution and may instead be engaging in
an activity better described as politics than as law. People who think this,
however, usually draw from it the corollary that the judges ought to be
cautious in the exercise of their power because the judiciary has less
democratic legitimacy than the legislative and executive branches of
government. Beatty is not bothered by this - he is delighted that, as he
states with some exaggeration, 'people all over the world have chosen to
put courts at the centre of their systems of government' (35) - because
he thinks that careful study of facts will always produce ajudicial decision
that is invariant to the political preferences of the individual judge. In
other words, interpretivism may be unconstrained, but fact-based adjudication is not. The reason it is not unconstrained is that there is always, for
Beatty, a fact of the matter. It is a fact that the state should provide
financial support for religious schools; a fact that the state must recognize homosexual marriage; and so forth. So, since all that the judges are
doing is finding facts, their activity is apolitical; they are not competing
with the elected officials whose acts they invalidate in the name - but it is
only in the name - of the constitution.
The facts speak to Beatty more clearly than they will to many readers.
For example, he commends the German constitutional court for having
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ruled that Bavaria 'does no wrong if it allows voluntary prayers to be
spoken in its schools but it does if it affixes crucifixes to classroom walls'
because 'for non-Christian students, the sectarian nature of the cross and
the fact that they could never escape its glare made its force much more
powerful than voluntary prayers' (46-7). Without more detail concerning
the court's analysis, which Beatty does not give, this sounds like a pretty
arbitrary judgment, with much of its force carried by the odd choice of
the word 'glare' to describe the appearance of a crucifix.
Elsewhere he applauds a Japanese court for having permitted the
government to make a small financial contribution to a Shinto groundbreaking ceremony for a gymnasium. He remarks that 'most people,
including those on the city council who voted for the expenditure,
regarded it primarily as a secular ritual dedicated to the safe construction
of the gymnasium that lacked a religious meaning of any significance'
(68). The suggestion is that the court was dismissing the religious
significance of the ceremony in much the same way that an American
court would be inclined to dismiss the religious significance of the
intonation of 'God save the United States and this honorable court' that
opens the sessions of my court. Still, it would be remarkable in the
American context to authorize public expenditures for religious ceremonies at construction sites. But what is more remarkable is that Beatty
should applaud a type of reasoning that disparages the significance of
religion, when he excoriates the US Supreme Court for failing to recognize, in its 'wall of separation'jurisprudence, the importance of religious
values (see 49-56). I agree with Beatty, by the way, that the Court goes
too far in trying to banish religion from American public life by exaggerating the harm inflicted on atheists by such things as voluntary prayers in
public schools or the inclusion of 'under God' in the pledge of allegiance. But that is a story for another day.
The Shinto case has another significance. It illustrates the curiously
denatured character of Beatty's discussion of cases, which belies his
pragmatic claims. I was curious about what on earth a 'Shinto ground4
breaking ceremony' might be, and so I looked up the case he discusses.
I found myself in a different intellectual world. The ground-breaking
ceremony was for a city gymnasium, was sponsored by the city's mayor
and subsidized from city funds, was presided over by four Shinto priests,
involved a Shinto altar and other sacred Shinto objects and purification
rituals involving the spectators, and lasted forty minutes. Shinto was the
state religion ofJapan until the United States occupied Japan at the end
of World War II, and was intolerant of other religions. Despite this
4 Kagunaga v. Sekiguchi (1977); see Lawrence W. Beer & Hiroshi Itoh, The Constitutional
Case Law ofJapan, 1970 through 1990 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996) at
478.
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history, and the emphatically religious character of the ground-breaking
ceremony, the majority of theJapanese supreme court ruled that because
'the average Japanese has little interest in and consciousness of religion'
- many of them, indeed, believe in both Shinto and Buddhism, and as a
result 'their religious consciousness is somewhatjumbled'- and because
Shinto is not a proselytizing religion, 'it is unlikely that a Shinto groundbreaking, even when performed by a Shinto priest, would raise the
religious consciousness of those attending or of people in general or lead
in any way to the encouragement or promotion of Shinto.'5 It would be an
impertinence for me to criticize the decision or its reasoning; but it is
apparent that the decision depends on particulars of Japanese culture
rather than on general principles that an American or Canadian court
might draw on. To such cultural differences Beatty is insensitive.
His faith in the objectivity of fact-based adjudication stems from a
belief that 'factual claims can be tested for how accurately they conform
to an independent empirical world, as it actually exists' (73). But this is
rarely done, or doable, in the adjudicative context. One will have sensed
already a rather casual attitude on Beatty's part, as on that of the courts
whose decisions he discusses, toward empirical testing. He is not above
criticizing judges for 'inflating the importance of facts' (107) and 'decreeing what facts mattered' (108) - as if it were possible to conduct factbased adjudication without making judgements of relevancy. Beatty
himself does this, perhaps unconsciously, when he states, in defence of a
us Supreme Court decision striking down state residency requirements
for entitlement to welfare benefits, that 'need, not length of residence, is
the proper criterion for distribution' (142). He neglects to mention that
a likely consequence of outlawing such requirements is to induce states
that have generous welfare benefits to reduce them, lest those states
become magnets for poor people in other states. That is a fact that a
court should at least take into account.
Beatty is also not above resolving constitutional issues by such tricks as
shifting the burden of proof to the side whose position he doesn't like, as
when he notes with approval that 'laws that regulate how people do their
work are more likely to be found wanting where it cannot be shown that
they advance the well-being of the community in some significant way'
(131) or when he says that 'no evidence is ever provided that would
support the claim that if gays and lesbians had the same rights and
freedoms as heterosexual couples, ... the moral character of the community and especially its young would be threatened in any way' (110) .' Why
is the burden of presenting convincing evidence to be placed on the
5 Ibid. at 483.
6 Incidentally, despite much talk throughout the book of 'fights,' Beatty claims that
'proportionality' 'makes the concept of rights almost irrelevant' (160).
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defenders of the challenged marriage laws rather than on the attackers?
In discussing a case that invalidated the exclusion of homosexuals from
the military, Beatty approvingly remarks that the court 'noted the lack of
"concrete" and "actual or significant" evidence that allowing gay men to
enlist in the armed forces would prejudice its morale, fighting power, or
operational effectiveness in any way' (113). He does not require that
there be 'concrete' and 'actual or significant' evidence that homosexuals
are harmed by the exclusion. Nor is he bothered by a lack of concreteness when he says that 'laws that establish a broadcasting system [must]
guarantee that the full spectrum of opinion in the community will be
heard' (145 [footnote omitted]). What is 'the full spectrum' of opinion,
and who is to decide? Must every lunatic have access to a broadcast
studio? Beatty contends that government has a constitutional duty to
subsidize religious schools but 'may make funding conditional on
religious schools agreeing to teach the same curriculum that is used in
state-run schools' (179). If the curriculum is identical, in what sense is it
a religious school? On the next page he says that 'proportional funding
remains scrupulously neutral as between the competing pedagogical
philosophies of secular majorities and religious minorities' (180). How
can a religious school implement its pedagogical philosophy if it must
teach the curriculum specified for state-run schools?
Beatty argues that 'there is no legal basis to permit traditional marriage laws [banning homosexual marriage] remaining in force for even
one more day,' since the 'evidence' in favour of permitting homosexual
marriage is as 'one-sided' as the evidence for permitting homosexual
sodomy (114-5). But the only 'evidence' he gives is that 'it is no longer
possible to argue that allowing [homosexuals] to swear a legal oath of
marriage will have a tangible effect on anyone else's welfare or wellbeing' (114). Well, but what about intangible effects? Remember that
Beatty insists that judges should decide constitutional cases without
regard to substantive values. John Stuart Mill's philosophy of tolerance
for acts that, though they may offend, inflict no tangible harm on third
parties is very attractive, but it is thoroughly substantive.
In fact most of Beatty's assessments of specific case outcomes are
generated not by testable (let alone tested) factual claims, but by such
ideological assertions as that in law 'liberty and equality ... mean exactly
the same thing. Regardless of whether a law is attacked under the banner
of equality or liberty, its legitimacy and its life depend on whether it can
pass a rigorous evaluation of its ends, its means, and its effects against the
principle of proportionality that connects all three' (116). (Notice the
burden shifting implicit in the word 'rigorous.') Indeed, he claims that
'liberty, equality, and fraternity all mean the same thing' (158). Within a
page of stating that 'ethical and prudential arguments [in constitutional
cases] make no sense,' Beatty equates 'proportionality' to a 'universal
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principle of distributive justice that is controlling in all constitutional
democracies and determinative of all human rights' (116-7). Elsewhere
he suggests that 'proportionality' means 'entitlements to fair shares of
whatever is being legislated' (133; see also 144-58). That sounds awfully
substantive, as does his precept that, 'as guardians of the constitution,
judges have a duty to ensure the rights and freedoms it guarantees get as
much protection as possible' (176), which seems to deny any weight to
considerations in favour of limiting such protection for the sake of other
values, such as internal and external security. Beatty even makes the
remarkable concession that 'what is just, what is in proper proportion, in
any case is particular to each community' (167). And hence it is proper
to restrict abortion more in Ireland than inJapan (168). Well, then, why
isn't it proper to limit homosexual marriage in Alabama, say, though not
in Massachusetts?
Beatty gives up too quickly, moreover, on the utility of constitutional
text and precedent to cabin judicial discretion. Remember his crack
about trying to decide a case on the basis of what framers of a constitution might have said 200 years ago? That is an apt observation if one is
talking about the original US Constitution, ratified in 1789, but many of
the cases that he discusses involve much more recent constitutions. He
never explains why, no matter how recent a constitution is - or how
clearly targeted it is on an issue that has come before the court - the
court is to disregard the words of the constitution and proceed immediately to application of the norm of proportionality. In a manner consistent with his disdain for interpretation as a judicial technique, he rarely
tells the reader what these foreign constitutions say. Acknowledging that
the texts of the world's constitutions differ a great deal, he states - as so
frequently in this book, hyperbolically - that
none of this rich variation in constitutional texts, however, has had any effect on
the way judges think about laws that intentionally provide more training and
employment opportunities for men than women. All the details and adornments
that are so important to those who negotiate and draft constitutions and international human rights treaties have absolutely no bearing on how these cases are
resolved: (81)
The people who write constitutions will be surprised to learn that they
are engaged merely in 'adorning' because all a constitution really is,
whatever it says, is a blank check written to the nation's highest court.
And if an originally opaque text has been clarified by precedent, and
people have come to rely on the precedent as an authoritative statement
of legal rights and duties, it is not obvious that the precedent should be
given no weight at all. Beatty gives no reason for according zero weight to
the reliance interest that precedents can create.
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He misses, too, the informational significance of precedent. If a
number of judges have come to the same conclusion, this is some
evidence, though of course not conclusive evidence, that the conclusion
is correct. Beatty himself clearly believes this, because he uses the concordance of different constitutional courts on issues such as homosexual
rights as evidence that these rights should be given constitutional status.
And he admires the common law method, which may be inductive, but
the principal data on which the inductive method of the common law
works are not facts but precedents.
There is a certain coarseness in Beatty's analysis. Repeatedly I heard
false notes being struck, as when he writes that 'the fact that it [a constitutional right t6 free legal aid] isn't mentioned in a text doesn't mean it
isn't there' (154) or that illiteracy has 'plagued the earth since the
beginning of time' (119) or that, for some people, driving a taxicab is a
'fundamental act[ ] of self-expression ... critical to their whole personalities' (131). Or, for that matter, that had the US Supreme Court 'remained faithful to originalism ... many of the rights and freedoms that
are cherished by Americans would be lost' (12). What is true is that the
Constitution would have been interpreted more narrowly, but there are
other sources of rights and freedoms besides constitutions, and it is
entirely unclear whether, if nojusticiable rights had been created by the
Constitution, the rights and7 freedoms of Americans would be fewer or
less extensive than they are.
It is also incorrect to say that 'marriage laws that refuse to recognize
same-sex conjugal relationships, do so explicitly because of the sex of the
people involved. It is legal for David to have sexual relations with and
marry Ninette, because she is a woman, but not Michael, because he is a
man' (79). It is not the sex of the other person, but the fact that the
other person is of the same sex, that triggers the violation of the laws.
Nor is it accurate to say that 'the sexist bias of our traditional rules of
marriage is precisely the same as the racism that infected the anti-miscegenation laws that were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court' (106).
Beatty says that originalists such as Bork or Scalia would 'abandon
original meanings when the words of the text or even their own moral
scruples told them that was the right thing to do' (14). But if words are
given their original meaning, how can 'the words of the text' tell the
judge to abandon that meaning? And while it is true that Bork and Scalia
are willing to allow a small safety valve for cases in which originalism
might yield truly abhorrent results, that falls short of a general 'moral
scruples' override.
7 See Richard A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2001) at 15-27 and references cited there.
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Nor is it correct to describe 'bigamy' as the Mormon practice that the
US government outlawed (40). That practice is polygamy; 'bigamy' is the
name given to the crime of being married to more than one person at a
time. These are small mistakes, like the numerous misspellings of names
('Kelson' for 'Kelsen,' 'Seigan' for 'Siegan,' 'Horowitz' for 'Horwitz,'
'Freidrich Hayek' for 'Friedrich Hayek'), or associating Hobbes with a
socialist 'right of subsistence' (119), or the misnaming of Employment
Division v. Smith (a case Beatty discusses at length) as Oregon v. Smith, or
the term 'ChiefJustice of the U.S. Supreme Court' (it should be 'Chief
Justice of the United States'); but the cumulative effect is to undermine
confidence in the care with which Professor Beatty has propounded his
astonishing thesis.
At this point the reader may be expecting that I, as an ardent advocate
of a pragmatic approach to law, 9 should be addressing the limits of
pragmatism; for do not the criticisms I have made of Beatty's book imply
that legal pragmatism indeed has limits that he has exceeded? This
depends on what is meant by 'legal pragmatism.' Pragmatism is indeed
empiricist, and legal pragmatism, or at least the version of legal pragmatism that I find attractive, insists that consequences should be front and
centre in the adjudicative process. But it is not the case, as Beatty seems
to believe, that the only consequences worth considering are the consequences for the people immediately affected by ajudicial decision. There
are systemic consequences as well that ought to be considered, and
among these are the damage to the democratic process, and to the law's
stability, that would be inflicted by a wholehearted embrace of Beatty's
program of fact-based constitutional adjudication. The practical effect
would be a breathtaking expansion ofjudicial powers at the expense of
the drafters and ratifiers of constitutions, legislatures, and officials, and
hence of voters and of the people at large. And because the judges would
be constrained only by their commitment to impartial factual inquiry,
and not by any text (constitutional, legislative, or judicial); because the
practical limits of adjudication prevent a deep judicial engagement with
the facts bearing on constitutional controversies; and because those facts
will differ unpredictably from case to case, it would be extremely difficult
for lawyers and lower courtjudges to predict from previous decisions how
future disputes would be resolved. The law would be thrown into a state
of extreme uncertainty. These would be high prices to pay for pragmatism. But, more importantly, they are not entailed by pragmatism.
8 The full name of the case is Employment Division,Department ofHumanResources of Oregon
v. Smith.
9 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism,and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2003).
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I have made many criticisms of this interesting book. But I do not wish
to end on a negative note. Beatty's criticisms of constitutional theorists
are spot on. And he vindicates his faith in the power, or at least potential
power, ofjudicial engagement with facts in a number of his discussions of
specific cases, such as Lochner v. New York,10 where he points out that the
maximum-hours law invalidated there had in fact been intended to put
small bakers out of business (135-6), or Employment Division v. Smith,"
where he points out that numerous states had made an exception to their
drug laws to permit Indians to use peyote in religious ceremonies,
without the sky falling (51). Above all, Beatty's book is both a timely
reminder of the importance of pragmatic engagement with reality in
constitutional adjudication and a fascinating tour d'horizon of an emerging global community of aggressively interventionist constitutional
judges. One may applaud or deplore the growing globalization of constitutional law, but one may not ignore.

10 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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